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Sensorimotor mechanisms can unify explanations at cognitive, social, and cultural levels.
As an example, we review how anticipated motor effort is used by individuals and groups
to judge distance: the greater the anticipated effort the greater the perceived distance.
Anticipated motor effort can also be used to understand cultural differences. People
with interdependent self- construals interact almost exclusively with in-group members,
and hence there is little opportunity to tune their sensorimotor systems for interaction
with out-group members. The result is that interactions with out-group members are
expected to be difficult and out-group members are perceived as literally more distant.
In two experiments we show (a) interdependent Americans, compared to independent
Americans, see American confederates (in-group) as closer; (b) interdependent Arabs,
compared to independent Arabs, perceive Arab confederates (in- group) as closer, whereas
interdependent Americans perceive Arab confederates (out-group) as farther. These
results demonstrate how the same embodied mechanism can seamlessly contribute to
explanations at the cognitive, social, and cultural levels.
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TOWARD A UNIFIED PSYCHOLOGY
Academic psychology compartmentalized the mind into cogni-
tive, social and cultural partitions, and developed for each a
self-delimited conceptual paradigm and explanatory tradition.
Typically, the cognitive, social, and cultural psychologists believe
that they target three different mental structures in the minds
of the same people. For the first, the research participants are
computer-like information processors (e.g., Newell, 1980), for the
second, they are social agents driven by basic motivations to ful-
fill interpersonal goals (Forgas et al., 2005), and, for the third,
they are normative populations immersed each in their local sys-
tem of values, beliefs, and worldviews (e.g., Shweder, 1996). With
these disparate levels of construct specification, cross-talk over the
epistemological fence is limited (e.g., Messick and Mackie, 1989;
Hong et al., 2000; Nisbett, 2003; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006). In
these accounts, the levels of the mind may, at best, interact, but
remain conceptually intact, much like billiard-balls that maintain
their self-contained identities through their collisions.
Our goal is to take steps toward a unified account of the human
mind by finding theoretical units of analysis that apply equally to
understanding the cognitive, social, and cultural aspects of behav-
ior. Alongside others (e.g., Schubert and Semin, 2009; Glenberg,
2010), we believe that the body has this unification potential; its
sensorimotor mechanisms can explain behavior that plays out in
a physical, social, or cultural context. Our strategy is to use the
bodily level of description to side-step the three different charac-
terizations of the mind found in the three sub-disciplines, and
thereby demonstrate the possibility of specifying level-neutral
mechanisms that could uniformly explain cognitive, social, and
cultural behavior.
Specifically, the empirical plan is to identify a sensorimotor
mechanism with proven explanatory power at one of these levels,
then to examine whether this samemechanism can predict behav-
ioral patterns that are well established at the other two levels.
Fortunately, one such mechanism has already been character-
ized and its cognitive (Proffitt, 2006) and social (Schnall et al.,
2008) effects successfully demonstrated. After reviewing these, we
present our own account to explain how the mechanism can gen-
erate plausible predictions in a cultural context, then we report on
two studies that generally confirmed our predictions.
MOTOR EFFORT IN BASIC COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL PROCESSES
In cognitive psychology, Proffitt and his associates forged a link
between two characteristics of the motor system, and they used
this link to propose a novel reformulation of the mechanism of
distance perception (Proffitt, 2006). On Proffitt’s account, the vol-
untary muscle system is sensitive to the bioenergetic status of
the body (Davis et al., 1997; Achten et al., 2004; Coyle, 2004)
while being simultaneously tightly coupled with the visual system
(Hommel et al., 2001). On the basis of this link, it was proposed
that distance perception could not only be conceptualized as an
algorithmic process determined exclusively by visual cues (e.g.,
Cutting and Vishton, 1995), but that it is an ecological integra-
tive process in which the motor system plays an important role.
Specifically, Proffitt predicts that visual perception of distance to
a target should be scaled by the motor effort required to interact
with (e.g., walk up to) that target.
The hypothesized effect of motor effort was confirmed (see
Proffitt, 2006, for a review): participants reported inflated visual
distance to targets that required more motor effort to reach.
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Participants who were wearing a backpack, exhausted, in poor
fitness, elderly, or in ill-health reported hills to appear steeper
when compared with their fit, healthy, younger, or rested
counterparts.
Could the same sensorimotor mechanism extend to the realm
of the social? Schnall and her colleagues (Schnall et al., 2008)
argued that a supportive other is construed by the body as a
potential resource, either providing a surplus of energy or easing
the burden on internal resources. Thus, social support enhances
the efficacy of the individual’s motor and cognitive systems during
task performance. To test this hypothesis, a group of solo par-
ticipants and another group accompanied by their friends were
asked to estimate the slope of hills. Others were asked to imagine
the presence of a friend, a neutral individual, or a disliked per-
son before offering their estimates. In both experiments, the real
or imagined presence of a (potentially) supportive other led to
smaller estimates of the hill’s slope.
MOTOR EFFORT AND CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE
AND INTERDEPENDENCE
To push the explanatory and predictive power of this mechanism
into the domain of cultural behavior, we brought together find-
ings from several lines of research. The first is that the motor
system is involved in interpersonal interactions. Of course the
motor system is needed to talk, to observe (e.g., move the eyes),
to move toward, and to cooperate in physical tasks. But addition-
ally, the motor system is used to help recognize the goals of others
using an automatic resonance process based on their movements
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Blakemore and Frith, 2005; Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005). When person A observes person B act, A’s motor
repertoire (predominately in premotor cortex) is automatically
activated, or resonates, and provides a model of what B is doing.
When successful, this resonance generates A’s goals when engag-
ing in this action, and A uses these goals as an understanding of
B’s goals. Note that this simulation, or resonance, is not in antic-
ipation of the B’s actions, but close to simultaneous with those
actions.
Conversely, when the relevant motor program does not exist in
A’s repertoire, or when it cannot be fluently implemented, then A’s
recognition of the B’s behavior is not as fluent, perhaps because
of the more energetic investment the motor system requires to
simulate the perceived action (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Casile
and Giese, 2006; Petroni et al., 2010). For example, perception
of familiar actions that the participant can fluently reproduce
is accompanied by a reduced BOLD signal at the motor cortex,
which is an index of low energy demands for simulating the action
(Tanaka et al., 2001; Muhlau et al., 2005).
Differences in communication style across cultures are one
important source of this familiarity effect on automatic motor
resonance as demonstrated using fMRI to investigate modulatory
effects of the perceived cultural membership on the activity of the
putative human homolog of the mirror neuron system (MNS).
Liew et al. (2011), for example, documented a higher BOLD signal
at the MNS sites of mainland Chinese participants when watch-
ing American communicative hand gestures that were unfamiliar
(e.g., “quail”) vs. familiar expressive American gestures (e.g.,
thumbs up). Caucasian Americans watching a Nicaraguan actor
modeling either native Nicaraguan or American communicative
hand gestures showed signs of more effortful motor resonance for
the former (whereas the effect disappeared when the model was
American; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2007). White and black female
(but not male) participants showed signs of more effortful motor
resonance with the same simple finger movements whenmodeled
by the other race compared to the same race (Desy and Theoret,
2007).
Thus, we propose that interactions with cultural out-group
members are expected to be more effortful than interactions
with in-group members. Note that out-group members poten-
tially differ from in-group members along many communicative
dimensions (Archer, 1997). For example, Russians may point
with the middle finger, not the index finger. Also, although facial
expression of emotions is qualitatively universal, differences in
the rules of display (e.g., of intensity) may be misleading in
cross-cultural encounters (Ekman et al., 1987; Matsumoto et al.,
2002). Relative to Westerners, for example, the Japanese tend
to mask both negative (Ekman, 1972) and positive (Matsumoto
and Kuppersbusch, 2001) emotional expressions. Consequently,
they rely (more so than Westerners) on vocally conveyed emo-
tional tone when inferring underlying emotional states (Tanaka
et al., 2010). And of course, accented pronunciation by those
speaking a second language often differs significantly from native
pronunciation in both segmental (place and method of articula-
tion, e.g., Gatbonton, 1975) and supra-segmental (stress, rhythm,
and intonation, e.g., Fokes and Bond, 1984) characteristics, and
is actually perceived as less intelligible by native speakers (Flege,
1988). All these differences are taxing for the motor system as
it attempts to resonate with observed actions [including reso-
nance with articulatory actions, as demonstrated by Fadiga et al.
(2002)].
Importantly, the more costly effort of cross-cultural encoun-
ters relative to within-cultural encounters is not only experienced
during interaction, but also shapes the default expectation of
interaction with out- vs. in-group members. Consistent with this
assumption, a meta-analysis of the social-projection literature
shows that projecting one’s own state is stronger onto in-group
than onto out-group others, specifically due to the perception of
higher self-other similarity with the former group (Robbins and
Krueger, 2005). That is, even when the interaction has not yet
started, people have an expectation of less (sensorimotor, com-
municative) similarity with an out-group member than with an
in-group member (which we will use later to justify the design of
our experiments).
In addition to the proposed main effect of group-membership
on the expected effort of interaction, a moderating effect needs
to be added. Cross-cultural psychology suggests that people may
develop an interdependent cultural orientation that stresses relat-
edness and harmony with their in-groups, or an independent one
that emphasizes the uniqueness of their individual selves (Markus
and Kitayama, 1991). People with interdependent self-construals
tend to live in societies with fairly homogenous ethnic composi-
tion (e.g., East Asia), and exhibit lower levels of mobility within
these settings, whereas independents typically live in ethnically
diverse populations (e.g., North America) and are much more
mobile relative to their interdependent counterparts (Triandis
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et al., 1988; Oishi and Kisling, 2009; Oishi, 2010; Schug et al.,
2010). It is important to note, however, that cross-cultural psy-
chology is moving away from identifying these categorical and
geographical cultural differences in social orientation (e.g., all
East Asians or all North Americans) to acknowledging that both
interdependent and independent self-construals can be found, to
a greater or lesser extent, around the world.
Thus, we come to the major hypothesis that drives our empir-
ical work, namely the cultural motor-effort hypothesis. First,
we suppose that cultures, and the self-construals they engen-
der, should be conceived more as a continuum than as cat-
egories. Thus, what we describe next for interdependent and
independent self-construals should be considered the ends of
the continuum. Second, people who live in a predominately
collectivist culture (and develop interdependent self-construals)
tend to interact with family, friends, and an in-group consist-
ing of ethnically and culturally similar people. Consequently, the
motor system is strongly tuned to resonate to the behaviors of
the in-group, and interaction with the in-group is smooth and
relatively effortless. However, for two reasons, these interdepen-
dents are at a disadvantage when it comes to interacting with
members of the out-group. Because they have little experience
with out-group members, they have had little opportunity to
tune their motor systems to the behaviors of out-group mem-
bers. Also, because of the strong tuning or specialization for
the in-group, their motor systems will have even more diffi-
culty resonating to the different accents, gestures, etc. of the
out-group than a non-tuned system. [We see this as anal-
ogous to the development of speech perception. Before an
infant is strongly tuned to its native language, it can per-
ceive phonetic distinctions that are not incorporated into the
native language (e.g., Kuhl et al., 1992; Aslin et al., 1998).
However, once the infant has had considerable experience with
the native language, the ability to perceive non-native distinctions
is lost]. Thus, interdependents experience a costly demand for
motor control and prediction during cross-cultural episodes of
interaction.
Third, people who live in a predominately individualistic soci-
ety are forced to interact with a diversity of others. Although not
as strongly tuned as interdependents to interactions with the in-
group, interactions with out-group members allow these people
to develop moderate skill to process and respond to people with
different accents, different communicative gestures and postures,
and so on. Thus, in contrast with interdependents, for inde-
pendents interactions with out-group members are literally less
effortful.
This hypothesis predicts that (a) interdependents anticipate
motor effort upon the prospect of interacting with out-group
members. This, in turn, modulates their subjective visual expe-
rience of the distance to out-group members such that their
estimates of distance are inflated relative to estimates of distance
to in-group members. (b) People with independent orienta-
tions should show a smaller difference in estimated distance to
in-group and out-group members; they anticipate much less dif-
ferential effort to interact with out-group individuals owing to the
diversity of their motor social repertoire acquired by immersion
in ethnically diverse settings.
Experiment 1 provides an initial, cost-effective test of the cul-
tural motor-effort hypothesis, albeit without sampling multiple
cultures. The hypothesis suggests that within any culture, those
who are more interdependent will resonate more strongly with
in-group members relative to those who are more independent.
Thus, we predict that relative to independents, interdependents
will see in-group members as closer.
The complex literature relating self-construal to prejudice
(cited by a reviewer of a previous version of this article) suggests
a different prediction. Some research suggests that individual-
ism increases prejudice (e.g., Biernat et al., 1996; Katz and Hass,
1988; Sears and Henry, 2005), and a few studies (e.g., Kleugel,
1990) suggest that within a collectivist culture there is a tendency
toward lower prejudice and higher tolerance toward the out-
group. If prejudice can be related to motor effort, then one might
expect that interdependents (from collectivist cultures) would see
out-group members as closer. However, our results suggest the
opposite, and so we frame those results in terms of the cultural
motor-effort hypothesis.
STUDY 1: DISTANCE TO AMERICANS AS PERCEIVED BY
AMERICANS
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
American participants (n = 33) were first trained on estimating
distances to a human target in terms of seconds needed to walk to
the target. Besides inducing a motor-oriented perception of dis-
tance, using seconds also minimized any potential effect of the
culture-specific distance measurement units (e.g., feet vs. meters)
on the reporting of perceived distance to the target, a tack that was
especially important in the second study, and used here to main-
tain the use of a uniformDV across the experiments. The training
comprised three trials. In each, the participant estimated the time
to walk to the experimenter, then actually walked up to her, and
finally received feedback on accuracy of the initial estimate. The
training distances in this stage were quasi-randomly selected by
the experimenter.
Immediately after training, but in a different location, the par-
ticipant made 36 distance estimates (three 12-trial blocks) to two
Caucasian (i.e., in-group) confederates1. The confederates stood
at marks along two (imaginary) axes that intersected where the
participant stood to make the estimates. The marks on each of the
axes were pre-set to be at six different distances from the intersec-
tion: the short-distance marks were at 6.77 and 8.77m from the
participant’s location at the intersection, the medium distances
were at 10.43 and 12.43m, and the long distances were at 20.43
and 22.43m. The use of two distances for each of the distance
ranges was meant to discourage participants from copying earlier
estimates in later trials.
On any given trial, the experimenter asked the participant to
turn away from both axes, one of the two confederates would
position herself at a mark, then the experimenter signaled to
1The three blocks corresponded to three types of barriers behind which the
participants stood: a physical barrier (a fence), a symbolic barrier (a cau-
tion tape), and no barrier. This independent variable was included to test
another hypothesis. Because the effect of barrier was not significant and did
not interact with other variables, it will not be discussed further.
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the participant to face the confederate. The participant was then
immediately asked to estimate, in seconds, the time it would take
her to walk to the confederate (half of the trials), or given a
2.5 foot-long stick and asked to estimate the number of sticks it
would take her to touch the confederate. On the next trial, the
same process repeated, except that the other confederate would
position herself on another mark on the other axis. The assign-
ment of the two confederates to the two axes, and the order of
distance presentation (i.e., short, medium, or long) were inde-
pendently counterbalanced within blocks and across participants.
Finally, after completing their distance estimates, the participants
filled out the Interdependence and Independence subscales of the
Self-Construal Survey (SCS) (Singelis, 1994).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
As expected, for these American participants the mean score on
the independence subscale (M = 5.12, SD = 0.73) was greater
than the mean score on the interdependence subscale (M = 4.60,
SD = 0.84), t(28) = 2.51, p = 0.02.We usedmulti-level modeling
(MLM) with maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters to
take advantage of (a) the continuous nature of the six distances
and the measure of cultural orientation, and (b) to obviate poten-
tial problems with the sphericity assumption. MLM is similar
to regression in that it estimates regression parameters, however,
maximum likelihood is used as the estimation procedure and esti-
mated along with each parameter is its own standard error. Thus,
the test for statistical significance is a simple t-test of the parame-
ter divided by the standard error, although the degrees of freedom
are often fractional because of the use of Welch-Satterthwaite
estimates.
Separate MLMs were run for the two estimates of distance,
namely number of seconds to walk and number of sticks. Four
participants were dropped from the analysis of number of sticks,
one for providing stick estimates more than 3 SD below the mean
and three for providing stick estimates more than 3 SD above the
mean.
The participants’ cultural orientation scores were computed
as the ratio of their responses to the interdependent and inde-
pendent subscales of the SCS (Int:Ind). As is recommended
for regression analyses that involve interaction terms (Aiken
and West, 1991), all of the independent variables were centered
around their respective means.
Table 1 contains the important results from the MLMs, and
Figure 1 plots the regression- estimated marginal means for the
Time estimates in seconds (on the left) and Sticks (on the right)
as a function of the actual distance. For both dependent variables,
the effect of Distance was significant. (For Time, the parame-
ter value of 0.858 indicates that the estimate grew by 0.858 s for
each one meter increase in actual distance; likewise for Sticks, the
parameter of 0.874 indicates an increase of 0.874 sticks for each
meter of distance).
More importantly, our predictions were confirmed in the
form of significant interactions of cultural orientation (Int:Ind)
and Distance for both the Time estimate and the Sticks esti-
mate. Rather than arbitrarily breaking the sample into those with
interdependent and independent self-construals and loosing the
statistical power inherent in the continuous variable, we used the
Table 1 | Parameter estimates (in seconds, upper panel) or
stick-number estimates (lower panel) to walk to or touch American
confederates.
Factor Parameter Seconds
df t p
Int:ind −3.000 29 −0.77 0.45
Distance 0.858 493 37.07 0.001
Int:ind × distance −0.384 493 −3.00 0.003
Sticks
Int:ind −3.09 29 −1.23 0.23
Distance 0.874 493.02 40.9 0.001
Int:ind × distance −0.47 493.02 −4.41 0.001
FIGURE 1 | Regression-estimated mean distance judgments to
American-looking targets. Actual distance is indicated on the abscissa.
Left: data from Americans estimating distance as time to walk to the target;
Right: distance estimated as number of hand-held sticks to the target.
regression parameters to estimate means for interdependents and
independents. The estimates for interdependents were obtained
by using a value for the Int:Ind ratio 1 SD above the mean Int:Ind
ratio (Aiken and West, 1991). Likewise, the values for indepen-
dents were obtained by using a value of the Int:Ind ratio 1 SD
below the mean of the Int:Ind ratio.
Turning to Figure 1, the statistical interaction becomes evi-
dent: interdependents, compared to independents, judge distance
to in-group confederates as smaller. Furthermore, the differ-
ence between interdependents and independents grows with
actual distance. This finding is consistent with our cultural-effort
hypothesis. Namely, interdependents, compared to independents,
spend more time interacting with their in-group and tuning their
motor system toward those interactions. Then, because expected
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motor effort contributes to distance estimation (Proffitt, 2006),
interdependents judge distance as smaller than independents.
The statistical interaction (that the difference in judged dis-
tance between interdependents and independents increased with
distance) is even more important than the main effect for demon-
strating that the groups were using different measurement scales
(Proffitt and Linkenauger, 2013). That is, when the unit of mea-
surement used by one group (e.g., X amount of anticipated effort)
is different from the unit used by the other group (e.g., 3X amount
of anticipated effort), then the difference in the groups’ esti-
mates becomes larger with increased distance (an interaction).
For example, suppose that Person A measures distance in feet,
and Person B measures distance in yards. At a distance of one
yard, the two measurements, 3 (feet) and 1 (yard), differ by 2.
But at a distance of 5 yards, the two measures, 15 (feet) and
5 (yards), differ by 10. Thus, the interaction is strong evidence
that the interdependents and independents are measuring dis-
tance using different scales, namely different amounts of expected
effort. Nonetheless, it is important to demonstrate that this
interaction is replicable, and that is one purpose of the next
study.
STUDY 2: DISTANCE TO ARABS AS PERCEIVED BY ARABS
AND AMERICANS
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Clearly, our novel findings in Study 1 need to be replicated and the
cultural-effort hypothesis subjected to further test. In Study 2, we
used Arab-looking confederates as targets: the confederates were
chosen to have dark skin tone, and one of them wore a head-
scarf, or hijab. Furthermore, we sampled both Arab (n = 16) 2
and American (n = 42) participants. All other aspects of the
design and procedures were identical to those of the first study,
except that the participants were asked to report their estimates
only in terms of time (i.e., number of seconds) to walk up to the
confederates.
We predicted that the effect of cultural orientation (Int:Ind)
on the American participants’ estimates would flip in direc-
tion relative to the effect in Study 1. That is, since the con-
federates were Arab-looking, and hence, out-group members,
the interdependent Americans would overestimate the distance
relative to the independent Americans. Because the interde-
pendents have tuned their motor systems to interact with
other Americans, they should expect greater effort in interact-
ing with the Arab-looking confederates than the independent
Americans who have a more broadly tuned motor system.
In contrast, we predicted that the Arab participants’ esti-
mates to their in-group looking confederates would resemble
that of the American participants in Study 1. Interdependent
Arabs have a motor system finely tuned for interaction with
their in-groups, and thus they should report smaller dis-
tance to the targets than the more broadly tuned independent
Arabs.
2We had hoped to include a larger sample of Arab participants. Unfortunately
given current political realities, many Arab students were not willing to
participate in psychological research.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The data from three Arab participants were dropped for pro-
cedural errors, and the data from one American were dropped
for providing an Int:Ind ratio more than 3 SD above the mean.
As expected, the mean Int:Ind ratio was significantly higher for
Arabs (M = 1.1, SD = 0.17) than for Americans (M = 0.98,
SD = 0.14), t(52) = 2.61, p = 0.012.
An MLM analysis was run to examine the main effects and
interactions of Distance, Int:Ind, and National culture (Arab,
American). The results are reported in Table 2.
Figure 2 plots the regression-estimated marginal means of
the participants’ walking-time estimates as a function of the
real distance. The predicted pattern of results was successfully
obtained in the form of two interactions. First, there was an
interaction of Culture (Arab vs. American) and Int:Ind on dis-
tance estimates. For the Arabs (bars on the left), the in-group
(i.e., Arab-looking) confederates were perceived as closer by the
interdependent than by the independent participants (distance
in seconds estimated, respectively, at 1 SD above and below the
mean Arab Int:Ind ratio). For the American participants, the
Table 2 | Parameter estimates (in seconds) to walk to Arab-looking
confederates.
Factor Parameter df t p
Int:ind 0.688 53.99 0.19 0.74
Culture −0.43 53.99 −0.33 0.85
Distance 0.813 1884.99 74.18 0.001
Culture × int:ind 18.6 53.98 2.42 0.02
Culture × distance −0.068 1884.99 −2.55 0.01
Int:ind × distance −0.018 1884.99 −0.25 0.80
Culture × int:ind × distance 1.236 1884.99 7.87 0.001
FIGURE 2 | Regression-estimated mean distance judgments (in
estimated time to walk to target) to Arab-looking targets. Actual
distance is indicated on the abscissa. Left: data from Arabs judging
distance; Right: data from Americans judging distance.
www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 885 | 5
Soliman et al. Sensory motor mechanisms unify psychology
pattern flips: the out-group (i.e., Arab-looking) confederates were
perceived as farther by the interdependent than the indepen-
dent subgroups (estimated at 1 SD above and below the mean
American Int:Ind ratio). Second, this interaction was modified by
actual distance to the confederate such that increasing the dis-
tance increased the size of the two-factor interaction. As with the
first study, this interaction strongly implies the use of different
measurement scales (e.g., expected amount of effort) associated
with cultural differences.
DISCUSSION
Contemporary psychology continues to be composed of diverse
discourse communities that do not make substantial connec-
tion with the discipline as a whole. These diverse communities
of psychologists, which have proliferated in rapid succession,
increasingly work under different, often conflicting, conceptions
of science (Hoshmand and Martin, 1994). . . In some cases, psy-
chologists appear to be more interested in contributing to a
subdiscipline or specialty than to psychology as a whole (Staats,
1983; Maclntyre, 1985). In this way, fragmentation has been, and
continues to be, as much a part of psychology as any of its prag-
matic definitional characteristics such as “the study of behavior”
or “the study of cognition.” Indeed, there seems to be no evidence
that psychology is united by any explicit conception or theoretical
framework. (Yanchar and Slife, 1997, p. 236).
What is psychology? Is it a single, coherent scientific disci-
pline awaiting transformation from the current preparadigmatic
state into a more mature unified one? Or, is it a heterogeneous
federation of subdisciplines that will ultimately fragment into a
multitude of smaller, more specialized fields? This is, in essence,
the “to be or not to be” question of the field (Henriques, 2004, p.
1207).
Psychology is what I call a modern disunified science, with a
plethora of diverse and unrelated scientific products but with little
investment in unifying those products. The resulting disorganization
of knowledge leads people such as Toulmin (1972) to consider psy-
chology a “would-be science.” A science in the early stage of disunity
does not have the full power of science, and it is not considered to be a
full science. That power and that recognition await the beginning of
the science’s advancement to unification. Psychology has not begun
that arduous journey. That will happen inevitably, in my opinion.
(Staats, 2004, p. 273)
These critical citations do not stand alone. They con-
cisely articulate a contentious meta- theoretical controversy
that has been reverberating since the latter decades of the
past century (Staats, 1983, 1991, 1999; Kimble, 1989; Sternberg
and Grigorenko, 2001; Driver-Linn, 2003; Goertzen, 2008).
Psychology is perceived by many as a “house divided,” a frag-
mented collection of sub-disciplines locked into pigeonholes of
disparate theoretical paradigms and levels of construct specifi-
cation, which makes an integrative understanding of behavior
difficult. In fact, this apparent lack of common theoretical princi-
ples that spans the array of psychological sub-disciplines has led,
in some extreme cases, to the reserved use of the label “scientific”
in characterizing psychological inquiry (e.g., Koch, 1993).
In light of this last and serious implication, we present
here among the first and most explicit empirical attempts to
counteract the disunity problem. We developed and experimen-
tally illustrated an approach to unification (Glenberg, 2010):
sensorimotor mechanisms can be exploited to traverse the cogni-
tive, social, and cultural domains of behavior while sidestepping
the incommensurable theoretical metaphors dominant in each of
these territories. Consistent with this approach, the two studies
reported here strongly point to the involvement of the motor sys-
tem even in one of the most abstractly-framed areas of human
behavior: culture.
By bringing together findings from the cultural and motor-
simulation literatures, we predicted that people with interdepen-
dent self construals would anticipate needing less motor effort to
interact with in-groups than with out-groups. In contrast, people
with independent self construals would anticipate more similar
motor effort to interact with in-group and out-group mem-
bers. We took advantage of the visual signature of motor effort
(Proffitt, 2006) to examine this cultural motor-effort hypothesis.
Based on Proffitt’s work, we expected inflated reports of visual
distance to be associated with greater expected effort.
Study 1 confirmed the prediction using two different means of
distance estimation, estimated time to walk to a target and esti-
mated number of sticks to the target. Relative to American inde-
pendents, interdependent Americans reported a shorter expected
time to walk to, and fewer sticks to touch, the American in-
group confederates. Study 2 replicated and extended the effects
by demonstrating that the interdependent Arab participants per-
ceived their in-group Arab confederates as closer than did the
independent Arabs, whereas the same Arab confederates were
perceived as farther by the interdependent than by the inde-
pendent American participants. In both studies, the difference
between the estimates of the interdependents and independents
grew with actual distance, lending further support to the psycho-
logical reality of the proposed cultural motor-effort construct.
These result sets are consistent with our prediction that several
of the basic characteristics of the motor system (i.e., it scaffolds
action recognition and intention-grasping through simulation;
it functions predictively by projecting its future states; and it is
sensitive to the cost of looming interactions) extend from the
basic cognitive (i.e., visual distance perception, Proffitt, 2006),
to the interpersonal (i.e., social support, Schnall et al., 2008),
and into the domain of self-construal and inter-cultural contact.
Importantly, one and the same bodily mechanism can explain
these otherwise diverse human behaviors.
Our findings are not the only demonstration of the princi-
ple of embodied psychological unity we are trying to promote.
In retrospect, many of the embodied-cognition findings may
indirectly support the unifying potential of the bodily mech-
anisms. For example, the neural circuits responsible for the
perception of somatic, visceral pain are (a) implicated in one’s
own experience of social emotions of seclusion (Eisenberger and
Lieberman, 2004), (b) resonate with the perceived pain of others
(Immordino-Yang et al., 2009), and (c) this resonance is moder-
ated by personality and cultural factors (Avenanti et al., 2010).
As another example, the primary somatosensory cortex (that
had long been considered to have a purely epistemic function)
was recently found to (a) resonate vicariously with the perceived
touch of others (Bolognini et al., 2011), (b) show moderated
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activity based on the assumed gender of who applies the touch
(Gazzola et al., 2012), and (c) shows higher resonance levels when
the observed touch is at a cultural in-group’s body (Xu et al.,
2009). And third, circuits that represent comparative magnitude,
intensity, and extent (i.e., spatial-cognitive functions; Dehaene
et al., 2003) were found to serve the homologous social function
of status and rank recognition and discrimination (Chiao et al.,
2009). Yamakawa et al. (2009), using fMRI, showed that a com-
mon neural substrate located in the parietal lobe is implicated
when participants judge the proximity of objects in the physi-
cal space as well as when they judged relationships of kinship of
family members and closeness of friends.
The above results may, in fact, take the argument for embod-
ied psychological unity (as exemplified in the current research) to
a neurophysiological level. Rather than being a mere metatheo-
retical necessity, the contention that bodily mechanisms can serve
multiple cognitive, social, and cultural functions may be reflec-
tive of a foundational principle for the functional and structural
organization of the brain. Anderson (2010) presents extensive
evidence that over both the phylogenic and ontogenic brain life-
times, “neural reuse” is commonplace. That is, the same neural
structures are re-used for progressively more advanced func-
tions. Thus, much as we have argued that sensorimotor systems
may underlie individual, social, and cultural behaviors, neural
reuse may be a neurophysiological mechanism for how the brain
responds efficiently to the cognitive, social, and cultural adaptive
demands. In this way, neural re-use may underlie the re-use of
sensorimotor mechanisms that we have demonstrated (see also
Immordino-Yang et al., 2010).
There is also a body of literature in social psychology that
is consistent with our findings. As one example, van Baaren
et al. (2003) examined how interdependence and independence
affects mimicry. Consistent with our notions of tuning andmotor
resonance, they report that interdependents produced more non-
consciousmimicry. Although less strongly tied to themechanisms
we propose, there is also evidence that mimicry (produced by
motor resonance, we suppose) also extends to positive social
interactions beyond the dyad (Ashton-James et al., 2007).
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that much more research is
needed to further validate the empirical unification approach
proposed here. As noted by a reviewer of a previous version of this
article, future research should employ designs that allow for a fully
crossed cross-cultural investigation. Adding an American confed-
erate to Study 2, for example, would permit examining the pro-
posed cultural motor-effort hypothesis at the (national/cultural)
group level, in addition to the cultural individual-difference level
(i.e., self construals of interdependence and independence) exam-
ined here. Alternative interpretations should also be ruled out.
For example, future studies should directly record the height
and walking speed (toward culturally neutral, inanimate tar-
gets) of interdependents and independents to eliminate these two
potential systematic confounds that could yield results similar
to the ones reported here (although the reversal of the effect
for Americans across the studies make this alternative unlikely).
Furthermore, we need to develop a more explicit, mechanistic
account of exactly how an anticipated increase in interaction
could be used to scale distance. In much of Proffitt’s previous
work, the connection is close and specific. For example, throw-
ing a heavy ball increases perceived distance to a target when
intending to throw, but not when intending to walk. However,
in our research and in Schnall et al. (2008) social and cultural fac-
tors that are not specifically related to the effectors affect distance
perception. Instead, social factors seems to have a generalized
effect.
In conclusion, these results are consistent with the cultural
motor-effort hypothesis, albeit with the limitations noted above
and the possibility of alternative predictions related to self-
construal and prejudice noted in the introduction. The results
also suggest that the conceptual tools of embodied cognition can
be used to help unify psychology by applying the same mechanis-
tic account for behavior at the level of the individual, the social
dyad, and the cultural group.
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